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Abstract. Automated negotiation between artificial agents is essential
to deploy Cognitive Computing and Internet of Things. The behavior
of a negotiating agent depends significantly on the influence of environ-
mental conditions or contextual variables, since they affect not only a
given agent preferences and strategies, but also those of other agents.
Despite this, the existing literature on automated negotiation is scarce
about how to properly account for the effect of context-relevant variables
in learning and evolving strategies. In this paper, a novel context-driven
representation for automated negotiation is proposed. Also, a simple ne-
gotiating agent that queries available information from its environment,
internally models contextual variables, and learns how to take advantage
of this knowledge by playing against himself using reinforcement learning
is proposed. Through a set of episodes against negotiating agents in the
existing literature, it is shown that it makes no sense to negotiate with-
out taking context-relevant variables into account. The context-aware
negotiating agent has been implemented in the GENIUS negotiation en-
vironment, and results obtained are significant and revealing.
Keywords: Agents, automated negotiation, negotiation intelligence, Internet
of Things, reinforcement learning.
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence has definitely entered the mainstream of business inno-
vation [1, 19]. Huge progresses in the existing technology [18], new theories of
intelligence [15, 20, 25], and the increasingly refined comprehension of biologi-
cal minds of humans and animals [12, 24], have lead to the development of new
mathematical models that tackle the problem of creating the so-called intelligent
agents in our daily life. Some examples of these are [8, 10, 22].
A topic that has gained attention among AI experts in recent years is the
implementation of intelligent negotiating agents. The reason behind this is that
people is usually reluctant to get involved in negotiations. As Fatima et. al. [9],
taken from [3], put it: “When engaged in complex negotiations, people become
tired, confused, and emotional, making naive, inconsistent, and rash decisions.”
This is a human condition: we could see it in our everyday life [11].
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To realize the promise of novel technologies such as Internet of Things and
Cognitive Computing, great efforts are being made to automatize negotiations
between artificial agents, although some doubts remain about the design aspects
of such artificial entities. A number of approaches to address this problem have
been proposed [6, 7, 14, 27]. We consider the contributions of Fatima et. al. [9]
and Baarslag [4] a great compendium of the state of the art in this research area.
In spite of the progresses made so far, there is an issue in automated negoti-
ation that, from our point of view, has not been properly accounted for in the
design of negotiating agents. This is the importance of the context in negotia-
tions, or the existence of key external variables that could provide a competitive
advantage when used to predict and model the opponent by associative learn-
ing, including its strategy and perceptions/assumptions from the context. As an
example, an agent could be i) informed about issues in the environment, beyond
the opponent himself, and ii) hypothesize about which information the opponent
is actually using to make his predictions and learn. The importance of learning in
automated negotiations has been previously recognized [28, 29], yet the context-
awareness capability is not widely seen as a key issue [2, 17, 26]. Most of previous
works circumscribe the agent learning to ad-hoc decision-making policies that
may not capture appropriately the influence of the context on the outcome of a
negotiation episode. To make our point clearer, let us discuss briefly some related
work. In [2, 26], the context is represented through a fixed model, but any new
variable that could change the course of the negotiation is discarded. Another
example is given in [17]. Although a novel approach to model the utility functions
of the agents is proposed, these functions are still prefixed and they do not take
into account changes in relevant contextual variables. Finally, in the GENIUS
negotiation environment [13], actually one of the most used negotiation simu-
lators and the one we also choose to run our own computational experiments,
the negotiation deadline is even of public (common) knowledge, when that is
certainly a decision that agents should be able to make on their own, based on
their strategies and the information available to them.
Based on the above considerations, the main hypothesis in this work is that
negotiating agents that learn to use in their benefit relevant contextual variables
to select and evolve their strategies will reap more benefits than those agents
that concentrate only on learning their opponents strategies independently of the
context. Accordingly, we aim to create a negotiation environment that includes
both contextual variables and context-aware agents. We design a novel context-
driven negotiation setting and insert therein a learning agent that takes this
context into account. This agent will use the available information alongside
with reinforcement learning [21, 23] and Self-Play to generate specific knowledge
about the context and select the proper actions as negotiations proceed. We will
then exploit this knowledge to interact with other negotiating agents defined in
the existing literature, agents that do not take into account contextual variables
and yet have won the ANAC (Automated Negotiating Agents Competition) in
the last years. We use the GENIUS tool [13] to run the simulated negotiation
episodes and obtain significant results.
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This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, a conceptual representation of
the negotiation setting for context-aware negotiating agents is discussed. Next,
we present “Strawberry”, our own context-aware negotiating agent. We define
its internal design and its Self-Play learning strategy alongside the “Oracle”, a
conceptual entity that is going to answer the information queries made to the
context by our agent. Later on, negotiation experiments are designed and run
to generate results that can test our main hypothesis.
2 Negotiation setting
In this section, the main structure and components that made up our represen-
tation of the negotiation setting are presented. As in most of related works, a
group of agents that agree to negotiate over certain issues are considered. To
highlight what is important to us, in this work we concentrate our efforts in
bilateral negotiations between two agents negotiating over one single issue with
discrete values using a discrete time line. The alternating offers protocol which
is, according to [9], the most influential protocol of all, is used throughout.
Formally, the context in which the negotiating agent is situated is divided
up in two abstract spaces: the agent’s private information and external context
(see Fig. 1). The agent’s private information is composed by all his internal or
private variables, those that other agents can not see but could attempt to model
observing the actions the agent performs. The external context is composed by
all the other agents in the environment and the external or public variables,
those that every agent would consider if relevant.
So, for a given agent, his private information is defined as follows:
PI = {X1, X2, ..., Xl} (1)
where Xi in equation 1 is the agent’s ith private variable.
Next, we define the agent’s external context as:
EC = {Opp1, Opp2, ..., Oppm} ∪ {Y1, Y2, ..., Yn} (2)
where Oppj in equation 2 is the j th opponent the agent can negotiate with, and
Yk is the kth contextual variable that the agent can query.
Finally, the agent’s negotiation environment will be defined by:
E = PI ∪ EC (3)
3 Strawberry: a context-aware negotiating agent
In this section, the proposed design for our agent Strawberry is presented. A
component-based architecture proposed by Baarslag in [4], which receives the
name of BOA (after Bidding strategy, Opponent model, and Acceptance strat-
egy), is appropriated enough for implementing Strawberry. However, in order to
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Fig. 1. Our negotiation environment from the perspective of a single agent.
test our main hypothesis, we incorporate to this architecture the possibility of
querying the environment, and define the resulting architecture as context-aware
BOA.
All these components and the resulting design are rather simple but will serve
our purpose. As can be imagined, we could make things as complex as we want,
but this view will suffice to prove our hypothesis about the role of contextual
variables that are common knowledge. We profoundly believe that keeping things
simple (as long as it is possible) is not only clearer, but also better.
On top of this architecture, we will use two techniques that are widely known,
namely Self-Play [22] and Reinforcement Learning (or RL) [21, 23]. Strawberry
will learn to better negotiate by simulating negotiation episodes against another
instance of himself while using the well-known Q-Learning algorithm.
In Fig. 21, we present a graphical representation of our agent Strawberry and
the different aspects that will be explained in the subsections below.
3.1 Environment model
We will begin with the description of our environment model. As we have shown
in Section 2, we believe the environment can be modeled in a group of variables
and agents (our opponents). All we need is to provide our Strawberry agent a
way to query context relevant information as deemed necessary.
To this end, we introduce the Oracle, a conceptual entity that could get real-
time information from the context variables and summarize it to our agent in
two state variables, necessity (ν) and risk (ρ), as follows:
ν = max{X1, X2, ..., Xl} ; 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 (4)
ρ = max{Y1, Y2, ..., Yn} ; 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (5)
1 Adapted from [5].
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These variables represent the state for associative learning used by Straw-
berry2.
Fig. 2. Context-aware negotiating agent.
3.2 Bidding strategy
Taken from Fatima [9] and references therein, a heuristic concession strategy for
Strawberry is defined as follows:
Ot = IP + (RP − IP ) ∗ σ(β, t, n) (6)
where Ot is the offer Strawberry will make at time t, IP is the initial price,
which is assumed to be the best deal the agent considers he can obtain from the
negotiation, and RP is the reserve price, which is the worst deal the agent can
achieve at the end of a negotiation episode. The concession strategy σ is based
on:
σ =
(
t
n
)1/β
(7)
where t is the time passed from the beginning of the negotiation, n is the dead-
line, and β defines the concession rate.
2 We use a conservative approach to this end, considering that our necessities and
risks are defined by the greatest necessity and the greatest risk the agent is subject
to. This criterion will suffice to prove our hypothesis
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3.3 Acceptance strategy
The acceptance strategy to be used is AC, taken from Baarslag [4], where its
effectiveness was demonstrated. It could be summarized as follows: our agent
will accept an offer from his opponent if and only if this offer supposes a higher
utility for our agent than the utility he would obtain from his own next offer. In
other words, Strawberry will accept the offer if:
u(OOppt ) ≥ u(OStrawberryt+1 ) (8)
where u(Oagentt ) is the long-term utility Strawberry will obtain from the offer O
made by the agent at time t.
3.4 Self-Play and Reinforcement Learning
Strawberry will use his self-play capacity to acquire some knowledge of his con-
text through the model he makes out of it. To this end, he will play with another
instance of himself, adapting his policy pi as he plays all the tricks he has under
his sleeve in order to get better and better (or so we hope).
Strawberry’s final desire is not only to maximize his next possible reward r
but also to maximize his long term utility R, as stated in Fig. 2. This learning
strategy is implemented by the Q-Learning algorithm, which consists of a func-
tion that iterates over the expected cumulative rewards for future time steps in
a negotiation episode (how many will depend on the tunning of the algorithm
hyper-parameters) given the actual state st of the environment providing that
the agent takes a certain action a from the set of possible actions A. The ac-
tion to take is determined by a policy pi derived from the Q-values, which are
the way this algorithm represents the immediate and long-term utility for every
state-action pair. At the end of each episode, Strawberry observes the immediate
reward r and the next state st+1 that the environment returns, and obtains the
Q-value from the best action the agent can take in that situation (indicated by
maxa Q(st+1, a) in equation 9). Then, the algorithm actualizes Q according to:
Q(st, at) = Q(st, at) + α
[
rt+1 + γ maxa Q(st+1, a)−Q(st, at)
]
(9)
We choose each state for Strawberry to be defined by the tuple:
s = (ν, ρ) (10)
where ν and ρ are the necessities and risks associated with the perceived state
of the environment, as mentioned earlier, and each action by:
a = (RP, β) (11)
where RP and β are the variables our agent will choose to vary his strategy.
A group of hyper-parameters need to be set in this algorithm to work; these
are , α and γ.  defines the greediness of our agent, that is, the probability
our agent takes an exploratory move (normally, a random move) rather than
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exploiting his knowledge (following the actual policy). α is the learning rate
parameter, which gives more weight to recent rewards than to past rewards. γ
is the discount rate, with which the agent will try to maximize the sum of the
discounted rewards he receives in the future. We could say we have past, present
and future in α, , and γ, respectively.
4 GENIUS
As has been said before, the GENIUS simulation software will be used to test
our main hypothesis regarding the key role of accounting for contextual variables
while learning to negotiate. GENIUS is a specialized non-commercial environ-
ment for simulating negotiations, where a given agent design can be implemented
and then faced against a set of previously available agents. The initial intention
of GENIUS was to prove that negotiating agents can be constructed using three
basic components: Bidding strategy, Opponent model, and Acceptance strategy
[4]. This component-based architecture receives the name of BOA.
GENIUS offers their users the possibility of creating negotiation domains,
with a variety of issues of discrete or integer nature. Then, agents profiles are
created, in which a set of preferences over the different issues is established,
which the simulator uses to compute outcomes at the time of the negotiation.
Finally, one can run single negotiations or tournaments, choosing agents from
the repository, creating new ones out of a group of available components, or
codifying one from scratch in Java within the GENIUS framework. Negotiations
are based on deadlines that are of common knowledge, and the GENIUS present
the results in a table and a chart, where the Pareto frontier, the Nash equilibrium,
and other social welfare measures could be seen.
The GENIUS simulator is a practical tool to try new agents in the field
of automated negotiations. Nevertheless, from our point of view, the context
and agent’s profiles implementation are rather simple compared to a real-life
negotiation setting. As we would like to prove that agents should take the context
into account so as to make more rational decisions, we then implement the
negotiation setting represented in Section 2 and include it in GENIUS. We will
use this new concepts in the next sections to define and develop the experiments.
5 Experiments
In this section, we will describe the experimental setting, how negotiation sim-
ulations were run, and the results obtained after negotiation episodes.
In the first phase, we had to make some changes and adds to GENIUS. New
features were developed in Java, using the IntelliJ IDEA environment, a package
that gave us the possibility to adapt GENIUS to our needs. Finally, we developed
our agent, Strawberry, with the capability to query contextual variables to the
Oracle mentioned in section 3.
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5.1 Setting
The first step to address our hypothesis was to create Strawberry’s private and
contextual variables. Without any loss of generality, only two variables in each
space (X1, X2, Y1, and Y2), that could take random integer values between 0 and
3 are considered, and then normalized to 1. These variables will later be accessed
by querying the Oracle, summarized in ν and ρ, and sent to Strawberry when
required.
The second step was to select a domain in GENIUS that could gave us
simple but revealing results, bearing in mind that the focus here are single-issue
negotiations. The domain selected was the “pie domain”, a problem usually
addressed in game theory[16] and also available in GENIUS, in which two agents
negotiate over a pie that is divided into a number of pieces (we choose this
number to be a thousand). The aim in this domain is to get as many pieces
as you can, taking into account that, if the deadline is reached without a deal,
every agent get zero pieces. The utility is given by how many pieces an agent
gets by the end of the negotiation episode divided by 1000.
The third step was to define the concrete aspects of the Q-Learning algo-
rithm. We designed a reward function upon which the environment would give
Strawberry a reward r at the end of each negotiation episode, depending on the
outcome of the negotiation and the environment state s at which the negotiation
takes place. This reward function is defined as follows:
– If the negotiation ended successfully:
r = u(Ot=end) (12)
that is, the utility that the agent obtains from the last offer reported.
– If the negotiation ended unsuccessfully:
r =

−1 if X1 = 3
−1/3 if X2 = 3
−2/3 if Y1 = 3 ∧ Y2 = 0
1/3 if X1 ≤ 1
2/3 if X1 ≤ 1 ∧ X2 ≤ 1
(13)
The rationale behind this function is that the agent would be not only con-
cerned by the result of the negotiation, but also by the perceived state of the
context and how it affects him.
A number of hyper-parameters had to be set in order to make Strawberry
capable of learning from reinforcements. As a common rule of thumb, α and 
are usually set to 0.1 [21], and γ to 0.9, values that contribute to a fast learning
by means of a reasonable exploration-exploitation trade-off. These are typical
default values in the bibliography.
Finally, we set three alternative values for ν and ρ corresponding to the
intervals [0; 0, 33], (0, 33; 0, 66], and (0, 66; 1]. We also define the actions allowed
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to Strawberry. We set three different values for β: 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0, and five
possible values for RP : 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, which provide Strawberry with
3 * 5 = 15 different concession rates. Summing up, we will have a maximum of
3 * 3 * 3 * 5 = 135 Q-values to learn.
5.2 Experimental design
The experiments were made in the pie domain, where a deadline of 180 rounds
was used for simulating the negotiation episodes, a value that GENIUS uses as
initial. The experiments were divide up in three phases: the learning phase, the
negotiation phase, and the Self-Play improvement phase.
In the learning phase, the Strawberry agent is set to negotiate against himself
using the tournament setting that GENIUS provides. Self-Play simulations were
run for 10, 100, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, and 10000 negotiation episodes in order
to see how much learning may affect the subsequent negotiation phase.
In the negotiation phase, tournaments are played against some of the existent
negotiating agents in GENIUS. We have chosen some simple ones and others
really difficult to beat, winners of previous ANAC competitions. The chosen
opponent types are:
– Random Party (RP)
– BoulwareNegotiationParty (B)
– ConcederNegotiationParty (C)
– CUHKAgent2015 (CUHK)
– AgentFSEGA (FSEGA)
– Agent K (K)
– IAMcrazyHaggler (Haggler)
– AgentSmith (Smith)
– Gahboninho (G)
– BRAMAgent (BRAMA)
Simulations were run in two different settings: Strawberry against all other
agents together, and Strawberry against each one of them, separately. Each
tournament consisted of 100 negotiations were Strawberry used the knowledge
previously gained through Self-Play, but did not learn whilst negotiating with
the other opponents.
Finally, the Strawberry agent is put to negotiate against himself, but this
time without doing any learning, in order to see if he achieves better agreements
in Self-Play compared to the different learning episodes he has previously done.
5.3 Results and analysis
After the learning phase, the negotiation phase has given us some interesting
results that are depicted in Fig. 3. At first glimpse, the cumulative utility of
Strawberry against the average opponent starts below 300 and reaches 400 as
he learns about the environment. This behavior was rather expected since the
reinforcement learning method resorts to the association of the goodness of an
action to the value of contextual variables. On the other hand, it is also possible
to see that taking the environment into account could change the perspective of
negotiation itself: Strawberry had received, in average, better outcomes than his
negotiation counterparts when considering the context of the negotiation. This
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reasoning tempts us to say that the environment should be taken into account
so as to gain a competitive advantage.
Fig. 3. Strawberry’s accumulated utility over 100 tournament scenario against the
average opponent, that is to say, the average utility the different opponents mentioned
in Section 5.2 have obtained. The horizontal axis shows how many learning negotiations
with Self Play has Strawberry made. The vertical axis shows the accumulated utility
throughout the 100 tournament negotiation session.
Another important observation to make from Fig. 3. If some agent consid-
ers environmental variables, there will be an increase in the rest of the agents
accumulated utilities, not only in his own. This astonishing result gives rise to
two different theories. The first one is that it could be possible that if one of the
agents takes some variables into account that the other does not, better agree-
ments are reached, with a tendency to improve social welfare. The second theory,
the one we think could explain better this phenomena, is that, as Strawberry
learns, he makes more rational decisions and does not take so many actions at
random. In this context, the other agents could build a better model out of him
and predict better what his moves are going to be. In other words, they model
the part of the environment they do not see through the model they made of
Strawberry’s behavior. We think this is one of the key aspects we have discovered
through our research.
In Fig. 4, we can see the utilities obtained by Strawberry against each par-
ticular agent, and the utilities obtained by his opponents, which do not take
environmental variables into account. Again, as expected, the utilities obtained
by Strawberry are always better when the rewards of the environment are con-
sidered than when they are not (the rewards that GENIUS gives). Another thing
we could see is that as agents get more complex (e.g., with opponent models,
environment model and flexible strategies, etc.), they make it more difficult for
Strawberry to get a good deal. Particularly, the CUHK agent seems to behave
really tough, not letting much to Strawberry, but still getting a great deal of
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accumulated utility. It is worth asking ourselves what would achieve an agent
like this if it were resorting to model the environment as well.
Fig. 4. Accumulated utility obtained by Strawberry after 10000 learning negotiation
sessions in Self Play against each particular agent, when it is considered the reward
from the environment and when it is not, and the utilities obtained by his opponents.
In the Self-Play improvement phase, we have reached other conclusions. As
can be seen in Fig. 5, we see how Strawberry achieves better and better agree-
ments as he learns associatively considering the context of the negotiation, thus
increasingly maximizing the social welfare over negotiations. Also, in the graph
on the right side, we see how Strawberry gets more successful negotiations as he
learns. Fig. 4 and 5 vividly highlight the importance of contextual-learning in
negotiations, as can be expected, following the previous results shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 5. The graphic on the right shows Strawberry’s Self Play improvement in accumu-
lated utility as he learns. In the left graphic, we see how many successful negotiations
reaches Strawberry’s when making 100 negotiation sessions against himself.
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A final comment can be made about reaching an equilibrium. We have shown
that Strawberry gets better through Self-Play and learning. However, he does not
tend to reach the Nash equilibrium that GENIUS proposes, as can be seen in Fig.
6, when playing against himself. In fact, there are no great changes in the mean
distance to the Nash point. It may be argued that this fact is because GENIUS
does not consider the contextual variables to calculate the Nash equilibrium, but
we do consider the competitive edge of a negotiating agent during the learning
phase. If we see the mean distance to the Nash equilibrium as the learning
advances, mainly after the 500 tournaments learning, there is a difference of
approximately 0,3, which shows that the Nash equilibrium is not situated where
the GENIUS locates it. In our favor, it could be stated that is not possible to find
the real Nash equilibrium of a negotiation game unless the relevant contextual
variables that affect all agents’ utilities are taken into account.
Fig. 6. This graphics presents in the vertical axis the mean distance to the Nash equi-
librium proposed by GENIUS in 100 Self-Play episodes once learning has ended. The
horizontal axis shows the number of learning episodes previously made by Strawberry.
6 Concluding remarks
The importance of key contextual variables have when two agents are negotiating
over a certain issue has been addressed. A novel way of modeling the negotiation
setting based on characterizing both the agent’s private variables, which consists
of the agent’s strategies and preferences, and the external context, where, besides
other negotiating agents, a group of external variables that influence the utilities
and values of concerned agents, are used to learn negotiation strategies.
The proposed Strawberry agent is a situated agent that resorts to contextual
variables to take some advantage. We have presented the way our agent account
for contextual variables, based on which his bidding and acceptance strategies
are built up. Then, we have explained how Strawberry would learn negotiation
knowledge using the Q-Learning algorithm and Self-Play.
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Computational experiments were designed to assess the validity of our cen-
tral hypothesis: the advantage of including contextual variables in a negotiating
agent. Results obtained confirm our earlier thoughts whereas other results are
rather unexpected. Strawberry is quite competitive in a heterogeneous environ-
ment composed of a number of agents, even though he makes no explicit model
of his opponents. We have proven that the utilities agents perceive are different
whether we take or not the variables of the external context and the agent’s
private variables into account. These results sustain our main hypothesis, but
more learning experiments are needed. We have seen, along with Strawberry’s
improvement, his opponent improvements as he learns. We theorize that the
models other agents make out of Strawberry help them discover implicitly the
external variables Strawberry takes into account, although they do not know of
their existence. It can also be stated, from the results shown in Fig. 4, that the
Strawberry agent reap higher utilities when he takes the external variables into
account. The importance of Self-Play for cheap Learning is highlighted through
results obtained. Hence, social welfare can be increased as agents learns collec-
tively through inexpensive simulation-based Self-Play learning.
As a final word, it can be said that our hypothesis seems correct from the
point of view of the Nash equilibrium. If we take the external variables into
account, it makes no sense to find an equilibrium between the strategies of the
negotiating agents considered in isolation. If contextual variables are not per-
ceived by any of the agents, then they would attempt to reach an equilibrium
that is nonexistent. Our agent Strawberry, simple as it is, when playing against
himself shows us that the equilibrium is somewhere else, not just “in the mid-
dle”. In other words, should we assume that, when two people claim for a piece
of pie, the whole is to be always divided exactly in two? We thing we should
not, and the results support our earlier thoughts that this division does not only
depend on the agents and the pie itself, but also on external variables agents
should not leave aside.
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